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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates Hume’s theory of the perception of spatial magnitude or size as 
developed in the Treatise, as well as its relation to his concepts of space and geometry. 
The central focus of the discussion is Hume’s espousal of the “composite” hypothesis, 
which holds that perceptions of spatial magnitude are composed of indivisible sensible 
points, such that the total magnitude of a visible figure is a derived by-product of its 
component parts. Overall, it will be argued that a straightforward reading of this 
hypothesis fails to do full justice to the complexity of Hume’s theory of spatial perception 
and geometry, and that a more adequate treatment must also admit an important role for 
the more direct process of spatial magnitude perception which he dubs “intuition”. 
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Among the current topics in Hume scholarship witnessing an upsurge in attention, 
few can match the inherent complexities associated with his doctrine of space, that often 
neglected and occasionally maligned theory put forth in Book I, Part II, of the Treatise.1 
Yet, despite this increase in academic interest, Hume’s concept of spatial magnitude—
i.e., the spatial size or magnitude of visible and tangible figures2—as opposed to his more 
general notion of space, has not attracted the same degree of attention. Even if 
commentators agree that Hume took the idea of space to be an idea derived from “the 
impressions of color’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner” (T 1.2.3.3), this fact does not 
tell us what measures the distance between these impressions (perceptions), or what 
psychological processes and empirical properties are involved in the act of determining 
size or magnitude. If one bears in mind that the concept of spatial magnitude is also 
intimately connected with the status of geometry, and the debate on whether Hume 
endorsed a synthetic or analytic a priori account of geometrical knowledge, the failure to 
study exhaustively Hume’s concept of distance becomes all the more astonishing.  
Finding a clear and comprehensive analysis of this issue in the existing Humean 
literature is quite difficult, but there would appear to be two seemingly polar opposite 
positions between which most commentators fall. First, there is the “composite” 
hypothesis, as we shall call it, which places a considerable emphasis on the aggregate 
structure of the “atomic” visual points that comprise larger extended figures (Broad, 
Falkenstein, Jacquette)3. On the other hand, there is an interpretational stance that 
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conceives spatial magnitude as a given, non-composite feature of our individual 
perceptions (possibly Waxman)4. The difference between these, respectively, “bottom-
up” and “top-down” approaches to perceived spatial magnitude could have far-reaching 
ramifications for the Humean foundations of geometry and mathematics. 
In what follows, I argue that Hume regarded spatial magnitude as a directly 
perceived, non-composite aspect of visual experience. After examining the details of 
Hume’s theory of space in section 1, section 2 focuses on a series of passages from the 
Treatise that reveal the intricate nature of Hume’s reflections on spatial magnitude, as 
well as its role in his more general theory of space. Finally, in section 3, the importance 
of Hume’s spatial theory is examined within a broader historical context.  
 
1. Space in the Treatise: A Concise Overview  
Hume’s lengthy analysis of space, extension, and geometry, appears early in the 
Treatise, most likely prompted by a perceived need to explain how the origin and 
function of this class of ideas does not undermine his empiricism (i.e., his more general 
theory of ideas, as espoused in the preceding Part I, of Book I). On the whole, Hume 
reasons that our idea of extension (space) is acquired, not from simple sense impressions, 
but rather from compound sense impressions: “that compound impression, which 
represents extension, consists of several lesser impressions, . . .” (T 1.2.3.15). Early in the 
Treatise, Hume lays out the distinction between the two types of perceptions: 
Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor 
separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguish’d into 
parts. Tho’ a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this 
apple, ’tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from 
each other. (T 1.1.1.2) 
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Hume’s claim that a compound idea “may be distinguished into parts” is a direct 
analogue of his claim that “space or extension consists of a number of co-existent parts 
dispos’d in a certain order, and capable of being at once present to the sight or feeling” (T 
2.3.7.5) The tenor of Hume’s account would thus seem to attribute a “part-whole” 
relationship to complex impressions. Just as the qualities of a particular taste, color, 
smell, are “united together in the apple”, thereby forming an inner-relationship of 
qualities, the simple impressions of extension are likewise united in our compound 
impression of extension. 
Furthermore, Hume’s belief that the idea of extension is obtained directly, or 
immediately, seems to rule out the faculties of imagination and abstract reason (as in 
“distinctions of reason”) from the process of magnitude perception.  
The Table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. 
This idea, then, is borrow’d from, and represents some impression, which this 
moment appears to the senses. But, my senses convey to me only the impressions of 
color’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner. If the eye is sensible of anything farther, 
I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it is impossible to shew anything farther, 
we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of 
these color’d points, and of the manner of their appearance. (T 1.2.3.4)  
 
Such claims as, “the table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of 
extension”, and, “the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these color’d points”, 
would appear to support the thesis that the perception of extension is direct: i.e., that our 
impressions are not first mediated or interpreted by way of a higher mental faculty that 
somehow constructs or fashions our perceptions of extension. The lack of any reference 
in the Treatise to the role of imagination or abstraction in the perception of extension also 
supports this conclusion (although this remains a contentious issue among 
commentators).5 However, Hume does allow imagination and distinctions of reason to 
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play a significant part in the formulation of our abstract conception of space, as when we 
conceive of extension apart from any specific color or extended body. Despite the fact 
that our original impressions of extension are conjoined with the colors of the extended 
bodies, Hume holds that we can “omit the peculiarities of colour, as far as possible, and 
found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points [that constitute the extended 
body]. . .” (T 1.2.3.4). 
Turning to the central components of the theory, Hume puts forward a notion of 
space (extension) as derived from “the impressions of color’d points, dispos’d in a certain 
manner” (T 1.2.3.4): 
The idea of space is convey’d to the mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor 
does anything ever appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible. That 
compound impression, which represents extension, consists of several lesser 
impressions, that are indivisible to the eye or feeling, and may be call’d impressions 
of atoms or corpuscles endow’d with colour and solidity. (T 1.2.3.15) 
 
The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last 
indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable 
when not filled with something real and existent. (T 1.2.4.2). 
 
Two additional features of Hume’s theory are evident in these passages: first, his 
“relationism” concerning our idea of space; and second, his “finitism” concerning the 
parts of extension, which he often refers to as “points” or “atoms”. As for the first, Hume 
insists that “we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing tangible 
or visible” (T 1.2.5.1), and “we have no idea of any real extension without filling it with 
sensible objects. . .” (T 1.2.5.27). This approach amounts to a sort of phenomenalist 
version of a relational theory of space, because it implies that we can have no idea of 
space if we do not receive any visual or tactile impressions/perceptions.6 Secondly, Hume 
furnishes a lengthy polemic against the infinite divisibility of extension, a section of Part 
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II probably inspired by similar arguments in Bayle and Berkeley.7 Although a thorough 
treatment of this issue lies outside the scope of the present essay, a brief summary of 
Hume’s argument can be given: because the human mind cannot obtain “a full and 
adequate conception of infinity”, and since that which is infinitely divisible contains an 
infinite number of parts, it must follow that “the idea, which we form of any finite 
quality, is not infinitely divisible” (T 1.2.1.2). 
   
2. Magnitude and The Composite Hypothesis 
2.1. Minimal Sensibles and Composite Structure. One of the predominant 
concerns of recent investigations into Hume’s account of space is the role played by the 
indivisible impressions of extension, especially the minimally visible points that 
comprise visual extension. Are spatial magnitudes formed, or built-up, out of the minimal 
visible points, such that the magnitude of an entire extended figure is the mere sum of the 
separate contributions of its composite minimals? I will dub this foundationalist view the 
“composite hypothesis”. On the whole, the published literature on Hume’s doctrine of 
space fails to address explicitly the question as to whether or not he endorsed the 
composite hypothesis. However, it would appear that the composite hypothesis is tacitly 
presumed by several prominent commentators, who suppose that for Hume the total 
magnitude of a visible figure can be reduced to a summation of each separate minimal’s 
magnitude. Falkenstein, for instance, claims that “there must in fact be only finitely many 
points given at the minimal degree of separation in any compound idea, and increasing 
the number must increase the size of the idea” (200). This explanation apparently holds 
for impressions, as well: “The size of impressions and ideas is a function of the number 
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of minimally visible or minimally tangible points they contain” (199). Dale Jacquette 
seems to make a similar point: “the idea seems to be. . . that by putting two or more such 
indivisibles together, even by the very slightest overlapping, the subject will experience 
an impression that is phenomenally divisible and extended” (1996, 72-73). 
Naturally, Hume’s account of the minimal visibles is crucially important in this 
context, for it provides one of the first instances of an alleged “decomposition” of a large 
(visually) extended object into its most elementary indivisible components. In section I 
(of Part II), Hume explains that if an ink spot is placed on a sheet of paper, and a person 
focuses on the ink spot while continuously moving backwards, then ultimately a position 
will be reached where “’tis plain, that the moment before it vanish’d the image or 
impression was perfectly indivisible” (T 1.2.1.4). At this location relative to the object, he 
reasons, the impressions caused by light rays (emanating from the object) “[are] reduced 
to a minimum, and [are] incapable of any further diminution” (T 1.2.1.4). All this seems 
to imply that a perception of an extended body contains a number of such indivisible 
minimals added together.8  
There is a good deal of circumstantial evidence in the Treatise that suggests that it 
does support the composite hypotheses of spatial magnitude. For example, Hume claims 
that the mind arrives “at an end in the division of its ideas [of any finite quality]” (T 
1.2.1.2), and that the view correlating the size of a line or surface to its total number of 
indivisible points is “just, as well as obvious” (T 1.2.4.19). In discussing the contiguity of 
these minimal points, furthermore, he reasons that “a blue and a red point may surely lie 
contiguous to one another without any penetration or annihilation” (T 1.2.4.6), a 
conclusion that would seem to imply, albeit tentatively, that the contiguous positioning of 
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these points has doubled the size of the corresponding impression (since their 
combination is exactly twice the size of either minimal when perceived separately). 
Finally, the mind is ascribed the ability, presumably via the faculty of imagination, to 
augment a minimal idea of extension by repeated addition:  
I first take the least idea I can form of a part of extension, and being certain that there 
is nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude, that whatever I discover by its 
means must be a real quality of extension. I then repeat this idea once, twice, thrice, 
&c. and find the compound idea of extension, arising from its repetition, always to 
augment, and become double, triple, quadruple, &c. till at last it swells up to a 
considerable bulk, greater or smaller, in proportion as I repeat more or less the same 
idea. (T 1.2.2.2) 
 
Given explanations of this sort, the appeal of the composite hypothesis is quite 
understandable: the repetition—i.e., cumulative addition—of a minimal idea is said to 
cause me to judge the compound idea to become double, triple, etc., thereby justifying the 
view that the perception of a figure as having a large magnitude just is the perception of it 
as having a large number of parts, and that the perception of one figure as being larger 
than another is the perception of it as having a larger number of parts. 
2.2. Imagination and Constructive Acts. Nevertheless, the problem with the 
evidence just presented in favor of the composite hypothesis is that it only pertains to the 
idea of space as deliberately processed in the imagination through a creative or 
constructive act: e.g., the mind arrives “at an end in the division of its ideas”, or “I repeat 
this idea once, twice, thrice, etc.” There is no reference to the spatial content or 
information encoded in our ordinary compound impressions and ideas of sensation (such 
as colored points “disposed in a certain manner”), where the role played by the faculty of 
imagination remains unclear. The ability of the mind to augment or divide its ideas of 
space involves the imagination in an elaborate exercise of addition or division. Hume 
 8 
regards all abstract ideas of space, including distance, as constructed in this fashion (T 
1.1.5; see, also, section 1 and endnote 5). Yet, the discussion of the philosophical 
relations, of which space and distance form a part, fails to mention how our non-
imaginary, sensible (visual and tactile) compound impressions and ideas of extension are 
processed by the mind, hence the passages just quoted (section 2.1) must remain 
inconclusive. 
Furthermore, the Humean concept of “intuition” greatly complicates any 
inference to a creative, enumerative act at the level of the ordinary compound 
impressions and ideas of sensible extension. Hume declares that several of the 
philosophical relations of ideas “are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly 
under the province of intuition than demonstration” (T 1.3.1.2). Ultimately, the relation 
“proportions in quantity and number” is included in this category, since the knowledge 
obtained concerning the relative equality (or congruence) of small portions of extension 
is “in many cases certain and infallible” (T 1.2.4.22). In this section of the Treatise, 
Hume is concerned with demonstrating that, despite the overall fallibility of our 
judgments of equality, there are cases when we can safely make such comparative 
judgments of object size, since “we perceive an impossibility of falling into any 
considerable error” (T 1.3.1.3). The closer the objects approach in size, the more 
unreliable these judgments become, which prompts Hume to remark that “where the 
difference [in size] is very great and remarkable”, we are on better grounds to “observe a 
superiority or inferiority betwixt any numbers, or figures” (T 1.3.1.3). The fact that he 
categorizes congruence judgments as “intuitive” mental acts is the relevant point at issue, 
however. Hume follows the precedent of many other Early Modern philosophers in 
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conceiving the faculty of intuition as a means of obtaining direct knowledge (in this case, 
of the relations of size) without any intervening ideas or mental acts. In David Owen’s 
description, such relations “can be known immediately, simply by comparing the related 
ideas. . . . intuition requires no steps of reasoning: no intermediate ideas need be found.”9 
The exact interrelationship of Humean intuition and imagination, if any, is a complex 
issue10, but a few general conclusions can be put forth with reasonable assurance: if the 
knowledge of the relative size of small visible figures is “comprehended in an instant” (T 
1.3.1.3), then it is no longer clear to what extent the normal interpretation of the faculty 
of imagination can be ascribed to this process of magnitude determination. Specifically, 
since the enumeration of points in the composite hypothesis (see the passage quoted 
above, T 1.2.2.2) appears to implicate the mind in an intentional, non-instantaneous, 
creative act of idea construction, any instantaneous determination of magnitude 
congruence would appear to run counter to the composite hypothesis. Therefore, even if 
the imagination is involved in the act of intuition—and it is not clear that it is involved, of 
course—it is not the correct form of imaginative act as required by the composite 
hypothesis. 
2.3. Hume’s Counter-Argument. If the objections raised thus far do not 
necessarily comprise a major threat to the composite hypothesis, there is still one serious 
obstacle that lies in its path. In section IV (of Part II), Hume reasons that the estimation 
of magnitude, or length, among two figures cannot be based on a process that equally 
pairs off their aggregate points: 
I first ask mathematicians, what they mean when they say one line or surface is 
EQUAL to, or GREATER, or LESS than another? . . . They need only reply, that 
lines or surfaces are equal, when the number of points in each are equal; and that as 
the proportion of the number varies, the proportion of the lines and surfaces is also 
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vary’d. But tho’ this answer be just, as well as obvious; yet I may affirm, that this 
standard of equality is entirely useless, and that it never is from such a comparison we 
determine objects to be equal or unequal with respect to each other. For as the points, 
which enter into the composition of any line or surface, whether perceiv’d by the 
sight or touch, are so minute and so confounded with each other, that ’tis utterly 
impossible for the mind to compute their number, such a computation will never 
afford us a standard, by which we may judge of proportions. No one will ever be able 
to determine by an exact numeration, that an inch has fewer points than a foot, or a 
foot fewer than an ell or any greater measure; . . . . (T 1.2.4.18-19)  
 
If, as the composite hypothesis maintains, magnitude is determined by the total number 
of points, then an inability to compute that total number renders the hypothesis “useless”. 
The structure of Hume’s argument takes a “reductio” form: (i) assume that the perceived 
magnitude of a figures is determined by enumerating the total number of points (the 
composite hypothesis), (ii) then demonstrate that it leads to the conclusion that the 
magnitude of the figure cannot be determined (since the total number cannot be 
computed), but (iii) since it obviously the case that magnitude can be discerned, (iv) the 
composite hypothesis thus cannot account for our ability to determine magnitude. It 
should be noted that this argument was fairly common during Hume’s time, for it appears 
in the work of such natural philosophers as Berkeley (see endnote 7). Part of the 
importance of Hume’s version of the argument, especially given the context of our 
investigation, is that he specifically mentions the underlying principle of the composite 
hypothesis “that as the proportion of the number varies, the proportion of the lines and 
surfaces is also vary’d”, and, more importantly, that the mind must “compute their 
number” as a means of determining their magnitude—and this last step would appear to 
single out the composite hypothesis for criticism. Slightly later in Hume’s discussion, a 
similar argument is leveled at the attempts to define “congruity” by the mutual contact of 
parts:  
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There are some, who pretend, that equality is best defin’d by congruity, and that 
any two figures are equal, when upon the placing of the one upon the other, all their 
parts correspond to touch each other. In order to judge of this definition let us 
consider, that since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a property in the 
figures themselves, but arises merely from the comparison, which the mind makes 
betwixt them. If it consists, therefore, in the imaginary application and mutual contact 
of parts, we must at least have a distinct notion of these parts, and must conceive their 
contact. Now ’tis plain, that in this conception we wou’d run up these parts to the 
greatest minuteness, which can possibly be conceiv’d; since the contact of large parts 
wou’d never render the figures equal. But the minutest parts we can conceive are 
mathematical points; and consequently this standard of equality is the same with that 
deriv’d from the equality of the number of points, which we have already determin’d 
to be a just but an useless standard. (T 1.2.4.21) 
 
In defense of the composite hypothesis, Falkenstein responds to these arguments 
by distinguishing between the minds ability to enumerate the points that comprise an 
idea of a figure, and the objective fact that the idea of the figure actually contains a 
definite number of points: “To say that a small figure may not be known ‘by an exact 
enumeration’ to contain fewer points than any larger figure is not the same as to say that 
it does not in fact consist of fewer points than any larger figure. The latter point is one 
that Hume is committed to” (200). He ultimately concludes, therefore, that “greater 
numbers of points in fact make the idea bigger, even though we may not be able to count 
them up and so determine by an ‘exact enumeration’ that any given figure in fact has 
more points in it than any other” (200).  
On the whole, Falkenstein is correct in making the crucial distinction between the 
number of points that a figure contains and the manner by which the magnitude of 
extended figures is computed. The problem with this form of response, of course, is that 
it admits that the mind’s process of determining magnitude and congruity is not a result 
of adding the individual component parts. If the mind does not proceed in this manner, 
then how does it determine magnitude? In particular, if the mind does not rely on the 
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computation of the indivisible points to measure size, then of what use is the composite 
hypothesis in explaining the perception of magnitude? On the composite hypothesis, the 
problem is even more acute, since a somewhat troublesome dichotomy would appear to 
surface in the mind’s capacity to estimate magnitude: on the one hand, there are the total 
number of points contained in the idea of a figure—points that objectively determine its 
magnitude, but which the mind cannot compute—and, on the other hand, there is the 
mind’s ability to determine the magnitude of the figure by a process somehow 
independent of computing the total number of its aggregate points. But, if the mind can 
determine magnitude without the need of a point summation, then why introduce the 
composite hypothesis at all? What work is it doing?  
In short, the problem with the composite hypothesis would seem to lie in an 
apparent disconnect, or breakdown, between its ontology of spatial ideas/impressions 
and the psychological process of magnitude perception that should naturally follow from 
this ontology. On the composite hypothesis, the ontology of spatial ideas relies on an 
aggregate point summation: as the number of minimal visibles is increased, the 
corresponding magnitude of the compound idea (or impression) is increased in a 
proportionate manner. If this hypothesis is correct, however, then one would expect that 
the perception of the magnitude of a spatial idea could be analyzed, or dissected, so that 
this increase in minimal visibles could likewise be perceived proportionately. Yet, 
Hume’s insistence that the perception of a large visible figure cannot be shown to 
possess more minimal visibles (than a simultaneously perceived smaller visible figure) 
would seem to imply that such additions of minimals cannot be perceived in a directly 
proportionate way; or, in other words, that it is not possible to perceive the individual 
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contribution of each minimal to the overall magnitude of the aggregate, although the 
individual contribution of each minimal point is central to the ontological account of 
spatial ideas/impressions. The psychological process of magnitude perception that is 
seemingly entailed by the ontology of the composite hypothesis is, therefore, rejected or 
dismissed in the Treatise. In the concluding section of this essay, nevertheless, I will 
hint at an interpretation that tries to incorporate much of the ontological content of the 
composite hypothesis without running afoul of Hume’s rejection of its implied 
psychology of magnitude perception.11 
 
3. Magnitude and Geometry 
3.1. Relations and the Arithmetic/Geometry Debate. If the composite hypothesis 
does not capture the full complexity of Hume’s philosophy of spatial magnitude 
perception, are there alternative interpretations of the hypothesis that do a better job of 
reconciling the disparate elements surveyed thus far? While the role of intuitive and non-
intuitive knowledge is essential to answering this question, it is necessary to investigate 
first Hume’s theory of relations, especially the distinction between “place” and 
“quantity”. First, Hume classifies “relations of place (space, distance, etc.)” as non-
intuitive since the “contiguity and distance between two objects may be chang’d merely 
by an alteration of their place, without any change on the objects themselves or their 
ideas; . . .”(T 1.3.1.1). In other words, relations of place cannot be determined by analysis 
of the objects and their properties alone, but depend upon the relations between those 
prior objects and bodily properties (i.e., epistemologically prior). In contrast, other 
philosophical relations, such as “proportions of quantity or number”, can be ascertained 
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with immediate and certain accuracy, since they depend “entirely on the ideas, which we 
can compare together” (T 1.3.1.1). Relations of quantity and number, accordingly, can 
only be altered by a direct change in the bodies and their properties (unlike the relations 
of place, whose spatial properties can change even though the bodies and their properties 
remain invariant). For instance, if a visible figure is perceived to be larger than a second, 
then this relationship (of “quantity”) can only be modified by changing the size of one, or 
both, of the figures. In the relations of “place”, on the other hand, one can constantly alter 
the relation (e.g., “x is left of y”) without affecting any of the “intrinsic” properties of the 
bodies/figures involved.  
Besides attesting to a strong brand of relationism (at the phenomenal level; see 
endnote 6), Hume’s contrasting approach to the relations of place and quantity parallels 
another dichotomy evident in Part III, section I of the Treatise; namely, the difference in 
epistemological status accorded to, respectively, arithmetic and geometry. Hume was 
well acquainted with this problem in the “foundations of mathematics” (as we call it 
today), since it constituted a major philosophical debate in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and even involved some of the most eminent mathematicians and scientists of 
the period (such as Barrow and Wallis). In brief, one school (Barrow) held that geometry 
formed the more fundamental and essential branch of mathematics, with arithmetic 
constituting a nominalist abstraction derived from geometry. Another school (Wallis) 
adopted the exact opposite view, taking arithmetic as primary and geometry as 
derivative.12 Hume apparently favored the former position, with certain qualifications (as 
will be discussed below), although it is not evident in his summary of the respective 
certainties that accrue to geometric and arithmetic operations: 
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Geometry, or the art, by which we fix the proportions of figures; tho’ it much excels 
both in universality and exactness, the loose judgments of the senses and imagination; 
yet never attains a perfect precision and exactness. Its first principles are still drawn 
from the general appearance of the objects; and that appearance can never afford us 
any security, when we examine the prodigious minuteness of which nature is 
susceptible. Our ideas seem to give a perfect assurance, that no two right lines can 
have a common segment; but if we consider these ideas, of the two lines, and that 
where the angle they form is extremely small, we have no standard of a right line so 
precise as to assure us of the truth of the proposition. . . . 
There remain, therefore, algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we 
can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a 
perfect exactness and certainty. We are possest of a precise standard, by which we 
can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers; and according as they 
correspond or not to that standard, we determine their relations, without any 
possibility of error. When two numbers are so combin’d, as that the one has always 
an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and ’tis for 
want of such a standard of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be 
esteem’d a perfect and infallible science. (T 1.3.1.4-5) 
 
Like Berkeley before him, Hume maintains a highly visual, image-based or idea-based 
theory of the mental processes associated with mathematics and geometry. Our 
knowledge of geometric propositions, on this view, is thus derived from “appearances”, 
presumably visual, which explains our inability to obtain precision and certainty in the 
conclusions we draw from them.13 
As regards arithmetic (and algebra), on the other hand, Hume’s reference to “a 
precise and exact standard”, and the fact that two numbers can be compared such that 
“one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other”, would seem to suggest 
that arithmetic is not closely bound to an image-based mental function: that is, arithmetic 
is more conceptual, and less visual—and since visual images manifest a geometric shape, 
it thus follows that mathematics is less geometric. This interpretation of the evidence is 
plausible, but Hume’s nominalist tendencies in mathematics would seem to undercut its 
force. Earlier in section II, Hume quite clearly ties mathematics, as “number”, to the more 
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visual-geometric entities he refers to as “unite”, thereby linking this discussion with his 
later use of “unite” in the passage quoted above: 
’Tis evident that existence, in itself belongs only to unity, and is never applicable to 
number, but on account of the unites, of which number is composed. . . . That term of 
unity [such as “twenty men are an unite”] is merely a fictitious denomination, which 
the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together; nor can such an 
unity any more exist alone than number can, as being in reality a true number. But the 
unity, which can exist alone, and whose existence is necessary to that of all number, 
is of another kind, and must be perfectly indivisible, and incapable of being resolved 
into any lesser unity. (T 1.2.2.3) 
 
In this quite remarkable excerpt, Hume seems to place the very foundations of number 
and unity, and consequently arithmetic, on the groundwork of his theory of indivisible 
minimals. The indivisible points constitute the nominalist basis of all mathematics, 
moreover, since the minimals also form visible figures (as “points disposed in a certain 
manner”).14 
3.2. Intuition and Sensible Figure: Towards a Synthesis. If algebra and arithmetic 
“preserve a perfect exactness and certainty”, in contrast to geometry, the decisive factor 
underlying this dichotomy would appear to be the cognitive process that Hume labels 
“intuition”. As described in section 2.2, Hume reckons that various philosophical 
relations “are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of 
intuition than demonstration” (T 1.3.1.2). The exact function of intuition in mathematics 
is disclosed in the same context, while explaining the relations of quantity or number: 
“As to equality or any exact proportion, we can only guess it from a single consideration; 
except in very short numbers, or very limited portions of extension; which are 
comprehended in an instant, and where we perceive an impossibility of falling into any 
considerable error” (T 1.3.1.3) One might infer, given the discussion above, that the 
“limited portions of extension” which Hume mentions in this passage only pertain to 
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indivisible minimals, but an earlier section clearly identifies the relative judgments of the 
size of extended visibles (if there is an appreciable size difference among the figures) as 
capable of certain knowledge as well: 
’Tis evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the 
proportions of bodies, and pronounce them equal to, or greater or less than each other, 
without comparing the number of their minute parts. Such judgments are not only 
common, but in many cases certain and infallible. When the measure of a yard and 
that of a foot are presented, the mind can no more question, that the first is longer 
than the second, than it can doubt of those principles, which are the most clear and 
self-evident. (T 1.2.4.22) 
 
This paragraph follows Hume’s apparent rejection of the composite hypothesis as applied 
to congruity (as quoted in section 2.3). In combining these scattered references to the role 
of intuition in mathematics, the following picture begins to emerge: If two or more 
visible (and presumably tangible) figures are of sufficient size to be compared “at one 
view”, or “comprehended in an instant”, then certain knowledge of their relative 
magnitudes can be ascertained (bearing in mind, once again, that the figures are not too 
close in size). Specifically, the figures must not be too large or too small to exceed the 
capacity of our visual (or tangible) field to take in the whole object, or objects, 
immediately and distinctly, and thereby render a judgment of relative size based only on 
that single perception—i.e., provide determinations of greater than, equal to, or less than, 
which fall under the heading of congruence, from one impression/idea. This 
interpretation is corroborated by Hume’s lengthy explanation of the uncertainties inherent 
to most geometric reasoning: “[Geometry’s] first principles are still drawn from the 
general appearance of the objects; and that appearance can never afford us any security, 
when we examine the prodigious minuteness of which nature is susceptible” (T 1.3.1.4). 
In other words, once the measurements of the geometric relations of size, magnitude, 
 18 
congruence, etc., go beyond what we can immediately determine in the visible figures 
themselves—and Hume is largely preoccupied with the imperceptible realm of the 
infinitesimally small—the certainties obtained with the larger extended visibles no longer 
hold: “Our ideas seem to give a perfect assurance, that no two right lines can have a 
common segment; but if we consider these ideas, of the two lines, and that where the 
angle they form is extremely small, we have no standard of a right line so precise as to 
assure us of the truth of the proposition” (T 1.3.1.4). 
With the disclosure of the important role of intuition, we are finally in a position 
to bring together many of the loose threads in our analysis of spatial magnitude and the 
composite hypothesis. For Hume, spatial magnitude is a perception that allows intuitively 
certain knowledge when confined to the relations of medium sized or significantly 
different visible or tangible figures; that is, for “very limited portions of extension; which 
are comprehended in an instant, and where we perceive an impossibility of falling into 
any considerable error [i.e., by the figures being too close in size, which greatly increases 
the possibility of error in our judgments]” (T 1.3.1.3) Conjoining this theory with his 
nominalist approach to algebra and arithmetic (as explored in section 3.1), the most 
plausible interpretation of Hume’s theory of spatial magnitude perception should thus 
regard the perception of extended visibles (tangibles) as primary, such that we do not 
directly perceive the abstract composition or structure of the separate minimals that form 
extended figures. Put simply, we perceive extended figures: we do not perceive the 
individual non-extended minimals arranged in a certain structural order. This may seem a 
trivial observation to make, but now we are in a position to defend this obvious claim 
against the advocates of the composite hypothesis who may insist, in a strict reductivist 
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manner, that “perceiving an extended figure” can be simply and completely explained as 
“perceiving a collection of non-extended minimal visibles arranged in a certain structural 
order”. If arithmetical concepts (such as numbers, addition, etc.) are ideas conceptually 
abstracted from our perceptions of extended figures, and quite possibly from the 
indivisibles themselves, then any formulation of the composite hypothesis that treats the 
magnitude of these figures as composite or aggregate structures formed through the 
perceptual addition of the more basic indivisibles seems rather misguided. As a notion 
derived from the perception of visibles, “addition” cannot itself be available for the 
psychological/perceptual construction of the visibles—to argue otherwise is to open up 
Hume’s entire theory of spatial perception to the charge of circularity. 
 
4. Conclusion 
All told, the composite hypothesis is faced with a difficult task: it must harmonize 
Hume’s ontology of spatial ideas/impressions, which relies on an aggregate structure of 
minimal points, with his psychology of the perception of spatial magnitude, which 
apparently does not rely on the perception of this aggregate structure. In response, 
proponents of the composite hypothesis might deny one of the key premises in the 
argument put forth against their view; namely, the assumption that the ontological 
structure of spatial ideas requires an exact correlate at the psychological level of 
magnitude perception. As presented in section 2.3, the case against the composite 
hypothesis largely rested on Hume’s assertion that the magnitude or congruity of a pair of 
visible figures can not be ascertained by a process of point enumeration (or by pairing off 
the visible points, etc.). It could be claimed, as a counter-argument, that the composite 
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structure of the minimals at the ontological level need not itself play a direct, or obvious, 
role in explaining the perception of magnitude; rather, it is just a primitive fact that the 
addition of more minimal points brings about (produces, creates, etc.) the perception of a 
larger visible figure. In effect, the composite hypothesist could respond by invoking the 
old axiom that “the whole [perception] is greater than the sum of its parts [the minimal 
points conjoined together]”, while simultaneously appealing to well-known instances of a 
perceived increase in size resulting from an addition of unobservable smaller entities 
(e.g., I perceive that the plant is bigger despite the fact that the added cells, etc., are not 
themselves visible to the naked eye).  
While this form of defense has its merits, and may well be what Hume actually 
intended, it harbors a significant problem. The lack of a parallel structure in our 
perceptions of material objects and their underlying ontology is acceptable (if still 
mysterious) due to the fact the underlying ontology is a physical, and not mental, 
property of the world, whereas perceptions are normally classified as mental content. In 
the case of Hume, unfortunately, this type of mind-body dualism of the perception of 
material objects cannot be upheld: the aggregate structure of points and the consequent 
judgment of perceived magnitude are both mental items (or, alternatively, they are both 
physical items, if one favors a physicalist interpretation of Hume’s talk of mental 
content). Therefore, one would expect a direct interrelationship or interconnection 
between a given aggregate structure of minimal impressions/ideas and the ensuing 
psychological process of magnitude judgment associated with that aggregate structure. 
Hume does not tell us how the ontological level of his theory of space perception links up 
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with the psychological process of magnitude judgment, hence the composite hypothesis 
must remain a problematic attempt to bridge this philosophical divide.15 
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